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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
M.A. STRAND, doing business as Strand 
Electric Service Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant} 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8594 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This was an action for breach of contract. From a judgment 
dismissing the action on the ground that it was barred by the 
four year statute of limitations, the plaintiff has appealed. 
Under date of December 10, 1943, plaintiff and defendant 
entered into a written contract under which the plaintiff was 
to constuct for the defendant a signal pole line between Caliente 
and Rox, Nevada (Exhibit 1). The contract incorporated cer-
tain photostats and drawings and provided, generally, that 
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the signal pole line would consist of approximately ten wires 
and would be constructed along the Railroad Company's right-
of-way between Caliente and Rox, a distance of approximately 
sixty miles. As compensation for this work, the defendant was 
to pay unit prices as specified in the contract. Unit prices were 
set out for installing poles (including crossarms and braces), 
((H" fixtures, guys, line wire, aerial cable, etc.; the unit prices 
for installing poles and guys varied, depending upon whether 
they were installed in loose earth or in rock (Exhibit 1, p. 2). 
The defendant also undertook to bear the cost of transporting 
persons, tools, equipment and materials required in the per-
formance of the work. Poles and crossarms were to be dis-
tributed along the right of way by the defendant in the vicinity 
of points of installation (Exhibit 1, pp. 2a and 2b). The signal 
pole line was to run approximately 40 feet from the tracks 
(Exhibit 1, Specifications for Signal Pole Line, P. 1). 
Among the contract provisions was one relating to adjust-
ments in price for extra work. Section 9 (Exhibit 1, p. 4) pro-
vided: 
((EXTRA WORK. It is understood and agreed that 
the Railroad Company shall have the right to make such 
changes in the amount, dimensions or character of the 
work to be done hereunder as, in the opinion of the 
Engineer, the interests of the work or of the Railroad 
Company may require; and if any such changes or 
alterations should diminish the quantity of the work 
to be done they shall not constitute a claim for damages 
for anticipated profits on the work so dispensed with. 
Any increase in the amount of the work to be done, that 
may result from such changes, shall be paid for at the 
same rates as similar work is herein contracted to be 
paid for; and, if such work is not similar to that herein 
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contracted for, the Contractor shall submit information 
concerning the nature of the same to the Engineer 
before such work is commenced and it shall be classified 
as cextra work' and paid for at prices to be agreed upon 
between the Engineer and the Contractor, prior to the 
commencement of the same; but, if the Contractor and 
the Engineer are unable to agree upon a price for such 
extra work, the Railroad Company may enter into a 
contract with any other party or parties for its execu-
tion or may itself perform any and all such extra work 
the same as if this contract had never existed. In case 
the Contractor does not present a claim in writing to 
the Engineer on account of the dissimilarity in the work 
by reason of such change within ten days after such 
change has been explained, the Contractor shall be 
forever estopped from making any claim therefor. 
A related provision was Section 20 (Exhibit 1, p. 9) : 
celt is distinctly understood and declared by the Con-
tractor that this contract is made for the consideration 
herein named, solely on information derived from others 
than the Railroad Company, its officers, agents or em-
ployees, and that the plans and specifications governing 
the work are subject to change and alteration as herein 
provided. Any deviation from said plans and specifi-
cations will be considered as an alteration and shall be 
determined as provided in Section· 9 hereof.'' 
Under the terms of Section 4 of the contract (Exhibit 1, 
p. 3), the plaintiff was to furnish a bond in the amount of 
$20,000 for the faithful performance of the contract or ccany 
change or modification thereof or addition thereto." The 
plaintiff did furnish a bond as required by this Section (Exhibit 
1, following p. 13). 
Plaintiff began work on the project on about February 15, 
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1944. At the outset some difficulty was experienced because 
of the failure of the defendant to deliver to the jobsite a rail-
road car containing the major basic tools and equipment of 
the plaintiff (R. 32). The defendant's engineering department 
staked out the course of the signal pole line (R. 3 7), but in so 
doing did not stake the line 40 feet from the nearest main track 
rail. The lines were placed about 90 to 100 feet from the track 
rail ~(pretty consistent for the first ten miles" of the signal pole. 
line (R. 39). The poles and crossarms, contemplated by the 
contract to have been delivered along the right of way ((at 
points of installation" (Exhibit 1, Specifications, General Infor-
mation, p. [b]) were in fact scattered along the track from a 
moving car, some distance from the point of installation 
(R. 44). In addition, the railroad company required the plain-
tiff to return to some areas and install extra crossarms at an 
increase in costs (Exhibit 3) . These changes in the performance 
required of the plaintiff were a major factor in his financial 
inability to go on with the contract (R. 44; Exhibit 3) . The 
plaintiff spent more in bringing poles and other material to 
the site of construction than in actually building the line (Ex-
hibit 3, p. 2). 
In the first part of September, 1944, plaintiff met in Omaha, 
Nebraska, with representatives of the defendant corporation, 
including Mr. Dickinson, the ((Engineer" under the contract 
(R. 66 and 67). At that meeting plaintiff explained the diffi-
culties encountered on the job and the construction costs which 
had resulted from placing the line at greater distances than 
40 feet from the right-of-way (R. 67). At that time the railroad 
company agreed, in substance, to change the method of com-
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pensation in the contract from a unit price basis to a cost basis 
(R. 74). The railroad company also agreed with the plaintiff 
that the date for completion of the line would be extended to 
late December, 1944 (R. 763). Subsequently, a second meeting 
was held, this one in Salt Lake City, Utah. Present at the meet-
ing were the plaintiff, the plaintiff's son, LeRoy Strand, and 
Oscar Jorgenson, accountant for the plaintiff (R. 69). Among 
those present on behalf of the defendant was B. H. Prater, 
the chief engineer for the railroad company. At this meeting 
the defendant again agreed with the plaintiff, this time through 
Mr. Prater, that the plaintiff's costs of performance would be 
paid for by the defendant (R. 69). 
The plaintiff resumed work under the agreement; but on 
December 5, 1944, L. D. Dickinson, defendant's general signal 
engineer, wrote to both the plaintiff and the New Amsterdam 
Casualty Company, surety on plaintiff's performance bond, 
indicating that action woud be taken on the bond if the job 
were not speeded up to the satisfaction of the Railroad Com-
pany (Exhibit 4) . 
It was established by the pleadings that the signal pole 
line was completed on or about January 7, 1945, and was at that 
time approved and accepted by the defendant (R. 8, 15). The 
complaint in the present action (R. 1) was filed on December 
20, 1950. The defendant raised the affirmative defense that 
the claim was barred by the statute of limitations relating to 
an !(obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing" (R. 17). On July 9 and 10, 1956, a hearing was had 
before the Honorable Jesse R. Budge, who had been appointed 
a judge pro tempore for the purposes of this proceeding. At 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the July 9 and 10 hearing the issues were confined to the ap-
plicability of the statute of limitations to the plaintiff's second 
cause of action (R. 80 and 81). Notwithstanding the scope of 
the hearing, the Court on August 2, 1956, entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the effect that the plaintiff's 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations (R. 84-86). Pur-
suant to the Conclusions of Law, judgment was entered on 
August 2, 1956, dismissing the plaintiff's action (R. 87). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court's Fin dings of Fact are contrary to and not 
supported by the evidence. 
2. The Court erred in its Conclusions of Law applicable 
to the facts of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY 
TO AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The Findings of Fact with which appellant takes issues are 
Nos. 4 and 5 insofar as they find the agreement between the 
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parties was materially altered and modified by the agreement 
of September, 1944, and find that the December 10, 1943 con-
tract, because of the agreement of September, 1944, was an 
agreement ((partly in writing and partly oral." Inasmuch as 
these findings were closely connected with the- conclusion of 
law that the action is barred by the four year statute of limita-
tions, appellant will argue both of the points together. 
It cannot be disputed that the contract of December 10, 
1943, was an integrated contract containing all of the necessary 
and material agreements between the parties. As of that date, 
any action brought upon it would undoubtedly have been an 
action upon a tccontract, obligation or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing" within the meaning of 78-12-23 Utah 
Code Annotated 195 3. It is the contention of appellant that 
the agreement of September, 1944, was one contemplated by 
the provisions of Section 9 and 20 of the contract, and was, 
therefore, merely one step involved in performance of the 
original agreement. Being this, it could be shown by parol 
without affecting the n character"-of the original document. 
We do not quarrel with the rule relied upon by the Court 
below that agreements which are ((partly in writing and partly 
oral" ordinarily come within the statute of limitations applying 
to oral contracts. 129 A.L.R. 603 (Annotation). The line of 
cases so holding, however, do not hold that the written part 
of the contract must contain every detail of performance. As 
stated by the writer of the annotation cited above: 
((The necessity of introducing evidence extrinsic to 
a written contract to establish the amount of money to 
which the plaintiff is entitled under such contract, where 
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there appears from the written contract an obligation 
of the defendant to pay money of some amount, con-
ditionally or unconditionally, does not render inap-
plicable a statute of limitations pertaining to written 
contracts or writings for the payment of money." 
The view expressed in A.L.R. finds support in a number 
of cases. See, for example, Lewis v. Taylor, 204 S.W. 383 
(Tex. Civ. App., 1918), and cases therein cited. The action in 
Lewis v. Taylor was brought for the price of a carload· of wheat, 
the written contract upon which the plaintiff relied having been 
composed of letters and telegrams. It appeared that after the 
exchange of letters and telegrams the price was changed verbal-
ly. The court held that inasmuch as the contract was in writing, 
a change in price would not affect the written contract, and the 
statute applicable to writings should govern. 
In Fabian et al. v. Lammers (1906), 3 Cal. App. 109, 
84 Pac. 432, adjoining landowners had contracts to build some 
levees across their respective properties as a step in reclamation 
of their lands from a swamp condition. The contract provided 
that the levees would be built cto£ the same size, height, width, 
character, and in accordance with" the decision of a named 
civil engineer. When the defendant failed to complete his 
levee at the agreed time the plaintiff completed it for him and 
brought an action for damages. The defendant claimed that 
the contract was partly written and partly oral, by virtue of the 
reference to a decision of the engineer, and was therefore barred 
by the limitation on oral contracts. The court acknowledged 
that the rule requires contracts to be entirely written in order 
to come within the statutes pertaining to written contracts but 
added: 
10 
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CCHow could this apply to the contracts in this case? 
Here the thing contracted to be done is to build a levee 
of sufficient height and width, to be determined by the 
parties to the contract or by a civil engineer. We think 
it sufficient that the contract was certain as to the parties 
and their respective agreement. What the defendant 
agreed to do is ascertained therefrom to a common 
certainty.'' 
In W. T. Rawleigh Company v. Graham (1940), 4 Wash. 
2d 407, 103 P. 2d 1076, the Rawleigh Company brought an 
action against sureties on certain contracts for the retail sale 
of Rawleigh products. In the agreements under which the sales 
were made the defendants had promised to pay the plaintiff 
for goods and merchandise sold to the principal buyer under 
the contract. The contract, however, did not set out the prices 
at which the sales would be made or at which merchandise 
would be delivered by Rawleigh to the buyer. In the present 
action the defendants contended that inasmuch as the amount 
to be paid must be proved by evidence outside the written 
contract, the statute of limitations governing oral contracts 
should be applied. The court held for the plaintiff, saying: 
CCThe written contract relied upon by the respondent 
is complete and furnished an objective standard for the 
ascertainment of any amount due thereunder from 
[the principal debtor] to respondent." 
In Lyons et al v. Moise's Executor (1944), 298 Ky. 858, 
183 S.W. 2d 493, the decedent Moise had entered into a con-
tract with W. L. Lyons & Company, a brokerage firm, under 
which Moise was to have a trading account with Lyons. The 
agreement provided, among other things, that Moise agreed 
to ccbe bound by the rules, regulations and customs prevailing 
11 
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in any market or exchange wherein you execute any orders as 
my agent at my direction, and to reimburse you for usual com-
missions and any advances made by you for my account." The 
brokerage firm brought an action against the executor to re-
cover on the accounts maintained by Moise during his life time. 
The executor defended on the ground that the contracf was 
executed only for the purpose of securing oral transactions 
and that the statute relating to oral transactions should govern. 
It was argued that the writing was an attempt to extend the 
five year statute, which was void as against public policy. The 
court held that the statute relating to writings was the one 
that governed. It said: 
(tif the written contract contains a definite promise 
to pay, but does not name the amount, the fact that the 
amount must be ascertained by evidence aliunde does 
not bring the contract into the category of one partly 
in writing and partly oral, but it remains a complete, 
written contract and is controlled by the limitation 
applicable to written contracts." 
A similar holding is found in Brown v. Irving, 269 S.W. 
686 _(Mo. App. 1925). In that case there was a contract relating 
to· the organization of a corporation. In the contract the de-
fendant promised, in exchange for a transfer of stock, ua sum 
in cash equal to the difference between $12,500 and the cost 
of reorganization of said company in sale of $90,000 par value 
of the preferred stock of said company." In an action on this 
contract the defendant contended that this provision was 
"merely an understanding, that if after paying the cost of re-
organization, etc .... there was any difference ... the defend-
ant would account to the plaintiff for the difference." The 
12 
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court held that the action was one on the contract, not for an 
accounting, and that the limitation relating to written contracts 
applied. The court said: 
ttlt is held that if evidence aliunde of the contract 
is necessary in order to establish the promise, the ten 
year statute does not apply (citing case), but it is the 
promise to pay that must be provided for by the lan-
guage of the writing, and such a promise cannot arise 
by proving extrinsic facts. However, the amount to be 
paid may be shown by evidence aliunde. The ten year 
statute of limitations applies if the cause of action is 
upon any writing for the payment of money or property 
which expressly or impliedly promises or agrees to pay 
money or property, whether the payment is to be certain 
or contingent.'' 
The Utah territorial statute of limitations was applied in 
Streeper et al v. Victor Sewing-Machine Company ( 1885), 112 
U.S. 676, 5 S. Ct. 327, 28 L. Ed. 852. There an action had 
been brought upon a bond given in connection with a contract 
for the retail sale of sewing machines. The bond was condi-
tioned upon the retailer's accounting for the proceeds of sales 
and purchase price of attachments, of paying personal notes 
for goods consigned, and of guaranteeing notes of others for 
sewing machines sold. In this action on the bond the sureties 
defended, in part, on the ground that the liability of the de-
fendant arose on the sales of goods to the consignee, and that 
the action was barred by the two year statute of limitations. 
The United States Supreme Court, in applying the territorial 
act, held that the four year (written) statute was applicable: 
CCEven as regards the consignees, an action against 
them, if not on the bond, would be on the written agree-
13 
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ment. The condition of the bond is, that the consignees 
shall pay all moneys which shall become due (under 
or pursuant to the within contract, or which shall arise 
therefrom, whether by book accounts, notes, renewals 
or extensions of notes or accounts.' We are of the 
opinion that, this suit being on a written instrument, 
the limitation was four years, the action was not barred." 
If the contract of December 10, 1943, had been a straight 
fixed-price contract with no provisions for changes in the plans 
and specifications and no provisions for changes in price be-
cause of such changes in the plans and specifications, the Court 
below might have correctly held that the September, 1944, 
agreement was a material modification or alteration of the 
earlier contract converting it into one ({partly written and partly 
oral." But the provisions for changes and compensation for 
them are of vital importance. Section 9 of the contract contem-
plated that some extra work would be done; and some of it 
might be of such a character that the unit prices set out in the 
contract would not be applicable. The contract provided that 
in event work is n not similar to that herein contracted for" it 
would (after certain other steps were taken) be paid for Hat 
prices to be agreed upon between the Engineer and the Con-
tractor.'' And if Section 9 was not broad enough as written to 
include modifications of the type involved inthis action, the 
railroad company added to its efficacy by the provisions of 
Section 20 which stated that ttany deviation from sa1d plans 
and specifications will be considered as an alteration and shall 
be determined as provided in Section 9 hereof." 
In view of the contract provisions, we believe it must be 
conceded that the changes in the placement of the signal pole 
14 
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line, and the requirement that the contractor retrace his steps 
in order to add extra crossarms, were nalterations" within the 
meaning of Sections 9 and 20 of the contract. We think it must 
be conceded, too, that the work as altered was ((not similar" 
to the unaltered work as the phrase is used in Section 9. This 
being true, the prices to be fixed for the alterations were to be 
fixed by agreement between the contractor and the ((Engineer." 
By the terms of Section 5 of the contract, the nEngineer" was 
to be the ((Chief Signal Engineer." The person who signed the 
contract with the plaintiff as nChief Signal Engineer" was 
L. D. Dickinson. At the September meeting in Omaha it was 
L. D. Dickinson who agreed with plaintiff that the unit price 
basis of payment would be.cha~ged to a cost basis (R. 66, 67). 
The use of changes articles in contracts has long been 
recognized as a valid method of providing for future co!ltin-
gencies. The United States Supreme Court has characterized 
a contract with a changes article as one in which the compen-
sation was to be ((the contract price, reduced by damages de-
ducted for delays and increased or reduced by the price of 
changes." Crook Company v. United States ( 1925) 270 U.S. 4, 
70 L. Ed. 438, 46 S. Ct. 184. If, in the present case, the changes 
had resulted in the contractor doing work which was ((similar" 
to the work provided in the contract (so that the unit prices 
would be applicable) we do not doubt that the contractor 
would have been able to show by parol the extra work done, 
and such showing would not have the effect of magically trans-
forming the December 10, 1943, contract into one that was 
'(partly written and partly oral.'' As view~d by the Court below, 
it: made all the difference in the world to the enforceability of 
15 
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the contract that the work was not {(similar," and that as a 
consequence the contractor and the engineer reached an agree-
ment, pursuant to Section 9, on the prices to be paid. We be-
lieve it was permissible for the contractor and engineer to agree 
to change the basis of compensation for performing the changed 
work, just as 1t would have been permissible for them to agree 
to increase unit prices sufficiently to compensate the contractor 
for the changes. Nor do we regard as of any significance the 
question of whether the agreement between the contractor and 
the Chief Engineer was reached prior to or after the work was 
begun. That technical provisions such as those relating to orders 
in writing, time for making claims for extras, and procedures 
for determining the amount of price adjustment can be waived 
is well settled. 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction Con-
tracts, § 23. The railroad company continued to act as if the 
September agreement between the contractor and the Chief 
Engineer was within the scope of the original contract. The 
letter of December 5, 1944 (Exhibit 4) and the letter of Feb-
ruary 16, 1945 (Exhibit 6) show that the defendant considered 
the alterations to be of such a nature, within the scope of the 
original contract or bond, that the surety was not discharged by 
the extension of time and agreement for change in the basis of 
compensation. 
Although this Court has not ruled directly upon the effect 
of changes in applying the statute of limitations, a recent 
case has recognized that changes made under contracts are 
merely part of the performance and can be shown by evidence 
outside the original contract. Hardinge Conzpany v. Eimco 
Corporation ( 1954), 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494, involved 
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a contract for the sale of merchandise. Under the terms of the 
original contract the seller, Eimco, was to pay the freight from 
Salt Lake City to York, Pennsylvania. By plaintiff's ctAlteration 
B" the price was reduced. Later an ((Alteration E" was issued 
by the plaintiff to the defendant directing shipment by govern-
ment bill of lading to Marietta, Pennsylvania, about twenty miles 
from York. The alterations issued were brief and apparently 
were signed by buyer only; they did not themselves contain 
all of the elements of a contract. The alteration requiring 
shipment to Marietta made no mention of the payment of 
freight, but only that the shipment would be by government 
bill of lading ((collect." Thereafter, Hardinge Company, the 
buyer, was required to pay the freight costs to the Government 
and sought to recover from Eimco. In defending the action, 
Eimco contended that it was not based upon an instrument 
in writing but was for money paid by mistake and was governed 
b~ the four year statute of limitations. In affirming a judgment 
for the plaintiff, the Court said: 
''The effect of Alteration E was to provide shipping 
instructions under an agreement already determined. 
It is fundamental that if effect can be given to both of 
two apparently conflicting provisions in a reasonable 
reconciliation that interpretation will control. 
* * * * 
"The rights of the Hardinge Company arose under 
the contract regardless of the fact the money was in the 
hands of Eimco at the time the suit was brought; if 
the price had not been stated in the contract, Hardinge 
would have no right to recover. Therefore, the promise 
was express and the action was founded upon a contract 
in writing and brought within the limitation period set 
forth in U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-23." 
17 
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The Court went on to cite the general rule that ((if a sub-
stantial doubt exists as to which is the applicable statute of 
limitations, the longer rather than the shorter period of limi-
tation is to be preferred." 
CONCLUSION 
Under construction contracts such as the one involved in 
this case, in which contracts the parties have included provisions 
for changes in the details of performance and correlative pro-
visions for adjustments in price because of such changes, parol 
evidence relating to the changes made and the correct resultant 
price adjustment rna y be introduced without reducing the written 
contract to the status of one ((partly written and partly oral." 
It is submitted that the case is no different because of the cir-
cumstance that the contract provides for agreement as to the 
adjusted price with reference to certain types of extras or 
changes. Action taken by the parties in agreeing to a price 
change for alterations in the plans and specifications is taken 
under the terms of the original written contract. 
Provisions for making changes in plans and specifications, 
and for making price adjustments for them, are a necessity 
tn a world in which complex building projects require a degree 
of flexibility in contracting. The needs of the construction 
industry would be hampered and the parties reduced to head-
butting if it were consistently held that their attempts at 
harmonious settlements of questions arising under contracts 
would ultimately prejudice their chances of recovering under 
the contract. 
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It is submitted that the agreement between the contractor 
and the engineer to change the compensation from a unit price 
to a cost basis was not a modification of the original contract, 
that it was an nalteration'' within the terms of the contract, and 
that the ccalteration" does not make the contract ccpartly written 
and partly oral" as ruled by the trial court. The contractor 
should be permitted to recover on the written contract, as 
changed. Certainly the attempt to proceed under the contract 
terms should not be given the effect of not only depriving the 
plaintiff of its provisions but of destroying his right to damages 
for any breach of the original contract by the defendant. 
The trial court having properly found that defendant 
agreed to pay on a cost basis, the judgment should be reversed 
and the case remanded to the District Court for determination 
of the amount due from defendant to plaintiff under the con-
tract as changed by the parties pursuant to Section 9 and 20. 
Respectfully submitted 
ALLAN E. MECHAM 
GROVER A. GILES and 
BRYCE E. ROE 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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